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AN ESSAY ON ABSTRACTION VS. THE CONCRETE IN MATHEMATICS 
R . W. Hanuning October 28, 1996 
The arguments for abstraction in mathematics are many and 
include the simple observation that as we get more and more 
mathematics, (at least a 1000 new theorems per day is an estimate 
of the current rate) only abstraction will get us through. On the 
other side are many mathematicians, such as Feller and Kac in 
probability, who have said that the abstract misses too much 
interesting detail. Thus the Lebesgue approach, via the 
Kolomogorov approach, loses all of reality so far as I am 
concerned, since it misses all the computable numbers which to me 
is the only reality we have to cling to. 
Saunders MacLane and others, after developing modern 
(abstract) algebra, have tried to introduce the abstract ideas of 
functors, etc. and have apparently met with little success. 
Perhaps they were too soon, and perhaps they simply missed the boat 
and wasted their, and others', time and efforts. I cannot say for 
sure which. Non-standard analysis is another recent example that 
you might consider - it seemed to put the infinititesimals onto the 
real line (note that the real line is thus not unique!) thus 
getting rid of the limit process in the calculus - and indeed some 
calculus books were so written - but it seems again to have been 
ignored. In around the 1850's or so a mathematician Grassmann 
wrote a book, including a second edition, on an abstract approach 
to linear forms, (including quaternions!) and was almost totally 
ignored; now he is recognized as having had something to say that 
was important and included a lot of what was later needed and 
refound, but to every such success (and well after he was dead so 
what good did it do him in his life?) I could probably find many 
more failures - generalizations that have been continuously ignored 
to this day. 
So there is no magic rule, method, etc. for deciding when to 
abstract and when not to. [Hamrning's theorem corresponding to the 
classic Turing's Theorem?] It is a problem in mathematics for 
which there is little literature to cite, but is a fundamental 
problem! 
The most general postulate I can think of is A = A. (although 
it need not be necessary! One need not have even consistancy in 
mathematics though most mathematicians assume they must!) Alone 
that single postulate gets you no where. If you add, things equal 
to the same thing are equal to each other, you can get the result: 
if A= B, B = C, .. . , Y = z then A= z. But for colors, and sound 
tones, (and indeed any continuous signal) you may not be able to 
tell A from B, B from C, etc. but you can tell A from Z. Thus any 
results you deduce will not universally be applicable. Generality 
• • 
• 
need not mean more range of application, it might mean less . 
In one book I wrote some thing like the remark that a 
generalization made for the sake of generalization when poorly done 
is soon forgotten. 
The history of number theory shows that much of what we now 
have came from isolated special cases that were observed and then 
wondered about, but there are some general theorems in number 
theory - but classically, most of the general results in number 
theory probably arose from observing many special cases before 
speculating about the genral case. Today it may be different -
people deliberately generalize for the sake of generalizing. Some 
fields of math thus do not grow much via the abstraction approach; 
but there are other fields that do! 
My view of probability theory is that one must cling to the 
models of reality that you want to use, and not go off into the 
wild blue yonder as does the usual mathematical approach - there 
are too many (two whole published books full of them!) well known 
paradoxes in probability that arise if you do. Indeed, as in the 
talk I gave on Tuesday, if in the usual interval [0,1] you remove 
the computable numbers, which are countable, then the axiom of 
choice says you can select a number from the uncountable rest, but 
you can never, never, name it! Can you "really" choose a number in 
that situation and in what sense? Does the axiom of choice really 
make sense in this case? Yes, it can be made an assumption, but 
then modeling the real world may produce a bad misfit and an 
undependable set of results of no use in understanding the world we 
live in and hence being able to use our understanding for our own 
benefit. 
In your essay you seem to be creating an art form for the sake 
of an art form, and there is little evidence that the future will 
regard your work as valuable, or pay you much so you can have the 
material goods of food, clothing, and shelter that you might later 
in your life want for you and your family. 
The essay you gave me to read shows you have a strong 
tendency, ability, and desire for abstration. To totally neglect 
it would be foolish, but to give into it totally would also be 
foolish. You have the problem, as many mathematicians have, of 
walking a line between the two extremes. Best of luck! 
